We do not study international relations for aesthetic reasons, since world politics is not beautiful. If we sought scientific rigor we would have pursued careers in experimental disciplines. Instead we are motivated by normative questions, often asked urgently in the wake of disasters, from the Sicilian Expedition (416 B.C.E.) chronicled by Thucydides to the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq (2003 C.E.). Recurring failures lead us to try to understand the conditions under which states and other actors can achieve their collective purposes rather than engage in destructive, and often self-destructive, behavior.
1 deeper sources of action in world politics, and to speak truth to power -insofar as we can discern what the truth is.
The study of world politics begins with the study of war. Why is war a perennial institution of international society and what variable factors affect its incidence? In understanding this problem, as well as other issues in world politics, Realist theory, which identifies power and interests as the central forces in the behavior of rational states, has played a central role (Morgenthau 1946 (Morgenthau /1967 , although it remained unclear for years why, if states behaved rationally, they could engage in mutually destructive warfare. Scholars have recently made substantial progress on this problem, notably by following the lead of Thomas Schelling (1960) in focusing on the role played by information and credibility (Fearon 1995) , and by linking the study of institutions to that of war (Fortna 2004 ).
The analysis of warfare relates directly to broader issues of discord and cooperation. Work on these issues over the last quarter-century has emphasized that cooperation arises more from discord than from harmony, and that when complementary interests exist, multilateral institutions can facilitate cooperation (Keohane 1984) . A productive line of work has stressed the role of reciprocity in creating incentives for cooperative behavior (Axelrod 1984) . These theoretical contributions are beginning to be linked to the literature on the democratic peace, which I do not have space to discuss
here.
An important contemporary as well as historical puzzle is how to think about the role of sovereignty. Under what conditions does it promote cooperation by limiting intervention and clarifying the actors in world politics, and under what conditions does it generate civil conflict by providing a shield behind which states can abuse groups within their societies? Recent work on sovereignty (Krasner 1999) has clarified various meanings of this concept, which has regained analytical significance with the increased attention to issues of civil war and intervention.
Behind all these issues lurks the concept of power. Material resources are significant not just for war and threat, but also for the politics of economic relationships.
The study of political economy can be viewed as "the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power" (Gilpin 1975: 43) . But we need to question the equation of power resources with material resources.
Joseph Nye (2004) has emphasized the role of "soft power"-attractiveness that inspires emulation and facilitates persuasion -in world politics. Soft power depends on the beliefs that human beings have and how they process information; hence its systematic study will require engagement with cognitive and social psychology, where recent progress has been rapid. Efforts to understand the sources of beliefs are likely to become more urgent for students of world politics as social mobilization and the ability of people to communicate directly with one another, unmediated by large institutions, continues to grow.
Questions about war and cooperation, and concepts such as power and interest, remain central to world politics. The field has recently become more aware, however, of the inferential biases to which students of international relations are subject. Wars and crises are rare events. Quite naturally, scholars seeking to understand them focus much more on these events than on the situations of peace, especially situations lacking crises at all. Insofar as our purposes are descriptive, this emphasis is unproblematic. However, when we seek to put forward explanatory propositions, we are in danger of selecting our cases on the dependent variable, which will bias our inferences (Achen and Snidal 1989; King, Keohane, Verba 1994) . We need continually to be aware of the uncertainty of our inferences -since our data is not generated by experiments and often the class of relevant events is small and not independent of one another -and to try to account for sources of bias.
Students of world politics have made theoretical progress in recent decades on issues of war, cooperation, and the role of multilateral institutions; and conceptual progress on issues of sovereignty. Impressive empirical work, guided by improved technical and methodological sophistication, has been carried out on a variety of problems, including warfare. However, most of this progress has focused on seeking to establish static conditional generalizations. Although we are living in a period of unprecedented change, our understanding of change is much inferior to our understanding of fundamental long-term regularities.
Six big questions about change over time
Compared to the history of civilization, much less of the human race, the known history of world politics is very short indeed, and the period for which reasonably reliable data exists is less than 200 years. Human nature has not changed during that time, nor has the fact that no world government exists. When students of world politics seek to make generalizations based on state behavior during the last two centuries, they implicitly assume that the actors and processes of the early 19 th century are essentially the same as those operating now. Much, however, has occurred in those 200 years to change some basic factors at work, including the nature of force and the structure of economic life. Furthermore, change seems to be accelerating, generating several new or newly urgent questions. World Wars and the Holocaust generated great disillusionment, but in the 1980s and 1990s hopes for progress, through learning or changes in principled ideas, were revived. The effects of changes in the ideas in which people believe are by no means necessarily benign, as illustrated by nuclear weapons and the recent militancy of Islamic fundamentalism. We should expect no simple answer to questions about progress, but they are nevertheless important questions to ask. (Slaughter 2004 ). There is considerable evidence for Slaughter's argument -from peaceful activities such as accounting and securities regulation and violent ones such as terrorism --but it is largely anecdotal. We need to understand these changes more systematically.
1) How has politics been affected by the expansion of force

4) What is the impact on world politics of the increasing diversity and complexity of social structures in the most powerful societies of the world?
5) What are the implications of electronic technologies, especially of the internet, for world politics?
To exercise influence, sets of individuals with common values or interests need to be able to communicate with each other, to form groups and to act collectively. Historically, such communication has been very difficult except through formal organizations, including the state;
and all but impossible across state boundaries except with the aid of states.
This formerly constant reality has been changing with incredible speed during the last two decades, and we have hardly begun to understand the implications of this momentous fact. One implication may be that collective action on a transnational or even global scale, for good or ill, is easier than it has ever been before. 
6) What modes of action can effectively
Issues of Institutional Design
I began this essay with the argument that the study of world politics is driven heavily by normative concerns, although in our positive research we have an obligation to follow the canons of scientific inference. If we are serious about these normative concerns, we cannot merely pontificate: we need to think deeply about these issues so that we can articulate coherent normative points of view, and then connect these normative issues with practical problems. For me, as a student of institutions, the most pressing practical problems involve institutional design. and economic welfare? It is not obvious that the tradeoffs made in wealthy democracies fully apply to developing countries, or societies with different cultural practices; yet for liberal cosmopolitans, there is an irreducible core of human rights that must be respected (Okin 1999) . What should these rights be considered to be?
The way we think about practical issues such as institutional design will necessarily be shaped by our answers to these fundamental normative questions. I am a cosmopolitan liberal democrat: a cosmopolitan, since I think that basic human rights are universal and not dependent on membership in a particular community; a liberal, because I give priority to liberty as a crucial value for a good society; a democrat, because I believe that elites should not only serve the public good but should be accountable to deliberative public views through institutions that give publics power over leaders. The two basic issues of institutional design that I raise reflect these values. The questions that I have emphasized are necessarily selective. Some issues have been omitted simply for lack of space. But I have deliberately omitted discussion of the alleged incompatibility of broad approaches to the study of international relations such as realism, institutionalism, and constructivism, since I regard these approaches as complementary rather than alternatives. The relevant question is to figure out how they 10 can be combined to address theoretically or practically relevant problems. Nor have I emphasized analytical or statistical tools that are playing an increasing role in scholarship, even though these tools have been valuable both theoretically and empirically. To my taste, there has been an overemphasis recently on tools at the expense of reflection about which questions are most important for the human race and for the ecosystem. Focusing on major problems can help us to figure out which insights from the broad approaches to the field are valuable, and which analytical tools yield genuine insights or evidence. If we then focus on developing testable theories, we can investigate their implications empirically. But if we fail to ask the right questions, there is no hope of getting the answers we need.
